

# **USCGC *Dallas* Med/Black Sea Deployment: Regional Engagement and USCG-USN Interoperability**

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## Summary

### Background

COMSIXTHFLT has received several requests from littoral nations for training and interaction in maritime law enforcement, maritime interception, search and rescue, fisheries protection, and other coastal patrol operations. In response, COMSIXTHFLT requested that a U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) cutter deploy to the Mediterranean and Black Sea from 29 May through 28 August 1995. USCGC *Dallas* (WHEC 716) subsequently visited seven nations: Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Tunisia, Slovenia, Italy, and Albania. COMSIXTHFLT requested that a CNA analyst be embarked in *Dallas* to assess the cutter's regional engagement role vis-à-vis U.S. Navy (USN) units and to identify analytic issues regarding USCG-USN interoperability.

### Rationale for using a cutter

#### Regional engagement

COMSIXTHFLT's message to CINCUSNAVEUR (P281045Z Jan 1995) states the primary hypothesis behind *Dallas*'s deployment—that the cutter provides a unique regional engagement tool. This report examines how the cutter contributes to SIXTHFLT regional engagement objectives. The argument that a cutter provides a unique form of engagement is as follows:

- The cutter will greatly expand interaction with these littoral nations and their developing maritime forces (presumably because of similarities in size, missions, and capabilities).
- The cutter provides a low-key or more discreet form of U.S. presence that can be used in situations where highly visible warship visits may not be appropriate because of political or military sensitivities.

## USCG–USN interoperability

*Dallas*'s deployment also exercised WHEC–battle group interoperability in support of the Coast Guard's national defense role. *Dallas* participated in exercises and operations with SIXTHFLT assets on several occasions during the deployment. This report examines *Dallas*'s operational role during battle group operations and identifies a number of issues that affect USCG–USN interoperability.

## Findings

### The cutter as a regional engagement tool

Using a cutter as a regional engagement tool enhanced the Navy's interaction with developing maritime forces by:

- *Expanding interaction with developing maritime forces beyond traditional USN interaction.* The countries that were visited are concerned with missions in which the USCG has considerable experience. The best examples include search and rescue (SAR), law enforcement, and maritime interception operations (MIO). Furthermore, these foreign maritime forces more closely resemble the USCG (relative to the USN) in terms of both organizational size and the type of assets they rely on.
- *Attracting a much broader audience than previous USN ship visits to the same ports.* Foreign naval officers and personnel from other military services as well as maritime police, border guard, customs, harbor master, and port authority personnel participated in discussions and demonstrations. These various agencies and organizations were all interested in specific areas of USCG expertise. In contrast, USN visits to the same ports attracted primarily a naval audience.
- *Contributing to ongoing debates in most of these countries concerning the development of their maritime forces.* Several foreign personnel stated that they considered the USCG to be a model for the development of their forces. Others stated that fiscal and other constraints precluded a separate coast guard, but realized the importance of including such expertise in their navy. Thus, the cutter visit potentially affects the development of their forces.

- *Reinforcing the relevance of interaction with the USCG and a cutter in a number of areas.* In Albania, the participants in a maritime law conference (co-sponsored by the USCG) participated in *Dallas's* MIO discussion. Other countries have recently hosted USCG Maritime Law Enforcement Training Teams, and others have sent senior officers to tour USCG facilities. The appendix contains details of some of these activities.

Although additional effects of the deployment may materialize in the future, immediate results attest to the "fit" or suitability of *Dallas's* visit to these littoral nations. These include requests for: future cutter visits, senior USCG officer visits, foreign students to attend the USCG Academy (USCGA) and other schools, and possible security-assistance relationships. (Again, the appendix contains greater detail on these effects.)

The fact that a cutter provides a more discreet or low-key form of presence in those areas where high-profile combatant visits are not appropriate was a distinct part of the rationale behind this deployment. The USCG argues this to be true based upon its experiences in the Caribbean and Latin America. SIXTHFLT sees this characteristic as a unique tool for its objectives. However, the *Dallas* deployment did not fully test this hypothesis in the Mediterranean and Black Sea. This argument specifically applies to those countries where the USN has been unsuccessful in developing relations or where considerable political or military sensitivities exist.

Two of the countries (Italy and Turkey) are NATO allies and enjoy good relations and close military support with the United States. USN ship visits to Turkey have been affected by political and military sensitivities in the past, but these interruptions have been temporary and Country Team personnel did not expect future problems. Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania are trying to strengthen their ties to the West, and view naval cooperation and ship visits as a sign of U.S. commitment. In these countries, there was little concern about the political "baggage" inherent with high-profile USN presence.

The Tunisians expressed some concerns that, given the country's role in the OAS and its relations with Muslim governments, a visible USN presence might not be acceptable in certain circumstances. For the most part, though, navy-navy relations with Tunisia remain strong. In

Slovenia, there were concerns about large-ship visits, but this was due to the inability of the city of Koper to absorb large numbers of U.S. personnel rather than to any political or military sensitivities.

## **WHEC–battle group exercises/operations**

In the case of *Dallas*'s Mediterranean deployment, the cutter played a limited operational role. Its battle group participation included providing CV escort and plane guard, providing a platform for SH-60 operations, conducting underway replenishments, maintaining communications, and receiving logistics support from SIXTHFLT. Exercises focused on basic communications and LINK drills and tactical maneuvering. In this sense, the deployment offered only a limited test of cutter–battle group interoperability. More extensive tests could be gained by including the cutter in fleet exercises (FLEETEXes) with a higher tempo of operations and a more demanding (albeit artificial) threat. Coast Guard cutters do, in fact, participate in battle group and Marine Amphibious Ready Group (MARG) operations. However, it was not clear from this particular deployment whether a higher tempo of operations or a more demanding threat would present more considerable challenges to interoperability.

As far as the operations and exercises conducted, *Dallas* was interoperable with battle group assets. Tactical maneuvering (during exercises and underway replenishment) was successful, as were communications in general.

We noted a number of detailed interoperability issues during the deployment, although none were operational “show-stoppers.” These included:

- Limitations with the current LINK configuration aboard *Dallas*
- The requirement for common message databases and boards for message traffic (and a compatible computer system in general)
- The question of logistics support for parts that are non USN-standard
- The use and support of a non USN-standard airframe such as the USCG HH-65A
- The requirement for an in-chop process for the cutter (non-battle group assets).

# Introduction

## The WHEC

### What is it and what does it normally do?

The 378-foot high endurance cutter (WHEC) is the USCG's most capable vessel and second in size only to its polar icebreakers; it has a complement of approximately 180 (21 officers). It was first launched in 1965 and commissioned in 1967—the first U.S. vessel with combined diesel and gas turbine. (It maintains both Pratt & Whitney FT4-A6 gas turbines and Fairbanks-Morse diesels, a combination that allows for speed and endurance: 14,000 n.mi. at 11 kt diesel, 2,400 n.mi. at 29 kt gas.)

The WHEC includes a flight deck and retractable hangar capable of landing LAMPS Mk III helos. The WHEC often deploys with an HH-65A or HH-60J. (*Dallas* deployed in this case with an HH-65A.) In terms of weapons, it is outfitted with a Mk 75/76-mm OTO Melara and the Mk 92 fire control system as well as small-caliber machine guns (25-mm and .50 cal) and defensive countermeasures (chaff and CIWS). In terms of command and control, the WHEC is outfitted with both LINK and OTCIXS and is full duplex-DAMA capable. Its radars include SPS 40B for air search and SPS 64(V)6 for surface search as well as WLR-1H for electronic surveillance measures.

The WHEC is the Coast Guard's primary command and control platform, given its LINK, OTCIXS, and communications capabilities. During Operations Able Vigil and Able Manner—in response to Cuban and Haitian refugees (respectively)—WHECs coordinated the rescue and return efforts of dozens of USCG and USN vessels. At the same time, the WHEC is used in various law enforcement patrols, including fisheries protection and drug interdiction, and as a search and rescue (SAR) platform.

## What did it do in the Med?

*Dallas* was informed of its deployment on 29 March 1995, only three days before a scheduled deployment to the Caribbean. Within less than two months, *Dallas* deployed to the Med and, ultimately, visited Romania, Turkey, Bulgaria, Tunisia, Slovenia, Italy, and Albania. Its schedule was as follows:

29 May	Depart Governors Island
10 Jun	In-chop, Rota, Spain
12-14 Jun	Exercises with COMDESRON TWO TWO
17-19 Jun	Exercises and Ops with COMCARGRU EIGHT
23-27 Jun	Mid patrol break, Istanbul, Turkey
28Jun-3Jul	Mil-to-Mil, Constanta, Romania
5-7 Jul	Mil-to-Mil, Samsun, Turkey
10-13 Jul	Mil-to-Mil, Varna, Bulgaria
17-21 Jul	Mil-to-Mil, Bizerte, Tunisia
24-28 Jul	Mil-to-Mil, Koper, Slovenia
29-30 Jul	Exercise and Ops with COMCARGRU EIGHT
31Jul-4Aug	Mil-to-Mil, Taranto, Italy
5-9 Aug	Mil-to-Mil, Durres, Albania
14-17 Aug	Mid patrol break, Palma, Spain
21 Aug	BSF and pick up Officer candidates, Azores
28-29 Aug	Ammo off-load, Earle, NJ
29 Aug	Return Governors Island

COMSIXTHFLT envisioned that the cutter would prove a useful regional engagement tool, given the degree of similarity between the missions of developing regional navies and those of the USCG. The deployment also afforded the opportunity to test USCG–USN interoperability by integrating the WHEC into battle group exercises and operations.

## Outline of the report

The document is divided in two sections. The first section, titled “The cutter as a regional engagement tool” discusses whether the cutter is a unique and appropriate tool for COMSIXTHFLT regional engagement. Regional engagement is the method by which U.S. forces interact with other countries and their militaries. The goal of this

interaction is to focus these countries on appropriate missions and interests that are beneficial to regional stability. It implies a more active military-to-military (Mil-to-Mil) relationship than traditional naval presence or simply "showing the flag."

The conclusions rely heavily on interviews and discussions with U.S. Country Team, EUCOM Military Liaison Team (MLT), and junior-through senior-grade foreign personnel. Through these interviews, we:

- Developed an understanding both of the interests of these maritime forces and the extent to which those interests resemble those of the USCG.
- Established the level of previous USN interaction in these countries and determined the extent to which Navy ships have addressed coastal and littoral missions.
- Assessed the value of the cutter as a more discreet form of U.S. presence.

In the second section titled "WHEC-battle group exercises/operations," we assess WHEC-battle group interoperability in the context of *Dallas's* deployment, and examine specific interoperability issues identified during the deployment. We include a summary of the exercises and operations in which *Dallas* participated to define the cutter's operational role and the extent to which the deployment truly tested interoperability. We also discuss specific interoperability issues that, while not problematic for *Dallas*, should be resolved before including WHECs in higher tempo operations or a heightened threat environment.

Finally, the appendix details *Dallas's* specific interaction with each of the countries.



# The cutter as a regional engagement tool

## What is regional engagement?

Regional engagement is a method by which U.S. forces interact with other countries. The goal of such interaction is to focus nations and their militaries on appropriate missions and interests, i.e., those that are non-threatening and beneficial to regional stability and to forward-deployed U.S. forces. Regional engagement implies a more active military-to-military relationship than traditional naval presence or simply "showing the flag." Its objectives depend heavily on active engagement through any number of avenues: ship visits, training teams, staff talks, exercises, wargames, or conferences.

Regional engagement strategies exist at a number of levels (e.g., The National Security Strategy; COMFIFTHFLT's Engagement Strategy; PACOM's Cooperative Engagement Strategy; or a Navy-wide Global Engagement Strategy, which is under consideration). *Dallas's* deployment supported COMSIXTHFLT's Peacetime Engagement Strategy, which focuses heavily on influencing emerging democracies, promoting coalition interoperability, gaining access to ports and facilities, and supporting NATO and Partnership for Peace (PFP) objectives.

## How does the USCG apply here?

The Coast Guard is a multimission agency with four general roles in the maritime arena:

- *Maritime safety.* This role supports national economic, environmental, and military interests through the national search and rescue (SAR) system, vessel traffic management services, modern aids to navigation, vessel inspection and manning, and international leadership in standards development. Safe and efficient use of the nation's ports and waterways is vital to a

healthy economy and the rapid deployment and re-supply of military forces.

- *Maritime law enforcement.* This role entails operating in U.S. waters, in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and on the high seas to enforce all U.S. laws and treaties. This includes reducing the flow of illicit drugs, interdicting illegal migrants, protecting fisheries and marine resources, and combating maritime terrorism.
- *Marine environmental protection.* This role contributes to the health of our environment through marine emergency preparedness, marine transportation management, environmental law enforcement, and pollution response.
- *National defense.* This role requires that the Coast Guard become a specialized service of the Navy in times of war. In addition, the Coast Guard contributes expertise in peacetime, including port security and law enforcement.

This combination of roles gives the Coast Guard a unique and seemingly contrasting nature. It is a humanitarian and law enforcement service; a regulatory and operational agency; an armed force and federal agency; and a domestic and international agency.<sup>1</sup>

Many of the countries in SIXTHFLT's area of responsibility are increasingly concerned with their economic, social, and environmental security. Consequently, there is a requirement for law enforcement and regulatory capabilities. With the end of the Cold War, naval missions are coastal/littoral in nature rather than open-ocean/blue-water. A Coast Guard cutter can address these concerns given its equipment and the training and experience of its personnel.

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1. Captain B.B. Stubbs, "The US Coast Guard: A Unique Instrument of US National Security," *Marine Policy*, Volume 18, Number 6, 1994, pg.506. The discussion of roles comes from the USCG Capabilities Manual (Commandant Instruction M3000.3A), October 1994.

## ***Dallas's* Military-to-Military plan**

Before deploying, *Dallas* personnel listed all possible areas of on board expertise that could be of interest to foreign maritime forces. This list was condensed to nine areas, which were formed into "discussion modules" to facilitate interaction with foreign personnel. They included:

Intro to the USCG	Deck Seamanship
USCG Aviation	Diesel Engineering
Maritime Interdiction	Auxiliary Engineering
Search & Rescue	Damage Control
Navigation	

These discussion modules were designed to foster interaction and professional exchange. They emphasized hands-on techniques and visual demonstrations to help overcome language barriers. The modules focused on areas of Coast Guard expertise. In the case of more general engineering, damage control, and navigation discussions, *Dallas* personnel covered topics important to smaller developing navies (e.g., the use of small boats, diesel and outboard motor maintenance, and water sanitation).

### **In-port activities**

Generally, the first day in-port was dedicated to official calls by the Commanding Officer with various naval, local, and regional government officials. Mil-to-Mil discussions typically began the afternoon of the first day or morning of the second with the Introduction to the USCG module. Others were held in the morning and afternoon, often with several discussion modules at one time. The most commonly requested modules were Coast Guard Aviation, MIO, SAR, and damage control. These modules attracted the most participants and generated the most discussion. An important part of *Dallas's* Mil-to-Mil interaction also included touring local naval facilities and ships and hosting tours aboard *Dallas*. The appendix details the events conducted in each country.

U.S. Country Team and foreign maritime personnel stated that USN vessels rarely promoted such a schedule of Mil-to-Mil discussions and events. USN ship visits often included official calls, community rela-

tions projects, and tours for the general public. In a few cases, USN ships have hosted more extensive Mil-to-Mil discussions (damage control and limited MIO discussions). But these are more heavily focused on military rather than law enforcement or regulatory operations. The reader should refer to the appendix for background on previous USN interaction and comparisons with *Dallas's* interaction.

### **PASSEXes**

PASSEXes or underway demonstrations were conducted with several nations after leaving port or while moored shortly before getting under way. In most cases, *Dallas* exercised with foreign navy units, though personnel from other organizations participated either on board their vessels or on board *Dallas*. (In Slovenia, *Dallas* exercised with Slovenian maritime police patrol boats. In Bulgaria, Maritime Border Police were actively involved in PASSEX planning and execution.) Planning meetings were held earlier in the week to gauge the countries' interests and ability to participate, and then to develop specific scenarios and communications scripts.

The PASSEXes focused on areas of specific interest to the country—usually maritime interception operations (MIO), SAR, and damage control/rescue and assistance—and applied the techniques and procedures from the Mil-to-Mil discussions in an operational environment. The foreign ship would simulate a merchant vessel in an interdiction scenario or, in another case, a vessel in distress. *Dallas* boarding and rescue and assistance teams would actually board the foreign ships to demonstrate their techniques. At the same time, foreign personnel would observe ship-handling, communications, and helo ops while cross-decked aboard *Dallas*.

There was considerable interest in *Dallas's* embarked helo during the PASSEXes. In four out of five PASSEXes, *Dallas's* helo demonstrated basic search patterns, deploying a rescue swimmer from the helo, and hoisting. In Slovenia, the helo was authorized to fly in Slovenian air space. The PASSEXes were often the most successful events in terms of the interest and enthusiasm displayed by foreign personnel. (Bulgarian officers dressed like pirates and hid from *Dallas's* boarding team during the MIO demonstrations.)

*Dallas's* PASSEXes were substantially different from previous PASSEXes between these countries and the USN. *Dallas's* PASSEXes focused on traditional Coast Guard missions and relied heavily on the use of small boats. Instead of an emphasis on tactical signals and communications using EXTAC 1000, *Dallas* relied on HO 102 (International Code of Signals) for all communications. This was appropriate given host nation emphasis on commercial and private vessels rather than combatants and battle group operations. For the most part, USN PASSEXes include battle group communications and tactical maneuvering drills.

**Bilateral Search and Rescue exercise (SAREX).** This exercise included *Dallas*, two Italian Navy (ITN), and two Italian Coast Guard (ITCG) vessels, as well as fixed-wing and helo assets prosecuting a SAR case under the direction of a rescue coordination center (RCC) in Rome. Commander, Atlantic Area (COMLANTAREA) provided a USCG liaison officer to assist with RCC coordination and to demonstrate the Geographic Display Operations Computer (GDOC) program for SAR planning. At the same time, the ITCG demonstrated its own software based largely on USCG SAR techniques and procedures. The exercise scenario realistically tested the response to and prosecution of a SAR case with numerous assets assuming coordinated track line search patterns while relying on an international SAR frequency for communications.

The SAREX was originally intended to last longer, but other events precluded sufficient search time. The vessels involved had only two to three hours of daylight search time and the exercise was concluded without locating the target. Still, there was a significant amount of interaction and professional exchange with cross-decked personnel aboard each of the vessels involved. Communications between *Dallas* and RCC Rome and the Italian assets were maintained, and initial reports from RCC Rome indicated that the Italians were interested in the USCG's GDOC software.

## Measuring "fit"

This section began by outlining *Dallas's* Mil-to-Mil program including both in-port and underway activities. It now discusses the "fit" or suit-

ability of the cutter deployment and its specific activities in light of the hypothesis that the cutter makes unique contributions to SIXTHFLT regional engagement. Unique contributions are (1) appropriate or compatible with the interests of regional forces, and (2) cannot generally be accomplished by USN ship visits.

We used the following factors as rough measures of “fit” to determine the suitability of the cutter visit. Although all factors need not be present in each case, the existence of several would seem to indicate a circumstance in which the cutter visit is an appropriate and unique engagement tool.

### **Missions/interests of foreign maritime forces**

The first factor—and the most prominent in COMSIXTHFLT’s original request for a cutter—is that the cutter’s capabilities and missions (and those of the USCG in general) match those of regional developing navies.

The following summarizes both the specific maritime organization in each country visited and the missions and interests of those forces. (Greater detail is included in the accompanying appendix.)

- *Bulgaria* maintains a navy as well as a maritime border guard under its Ministry of the Interior. The navy is concerned with maritime interception to counter smuggling and to support a potential multinational embargo, fisheries protection (largely in response to Turkish vessels), vessel safety and customs inspection, rescue and assistance of vessels, search and rescue (including a specific interest in developing hoisting capabilities for its helos), and maintaining buoys and navigational aids. At the same time, the Bulgarian Navy remains concerned with its more traditional naval missions of ASW, mine warfare, and the defense of sea transport. The maritime border guard supports the same coastal missions usually closer to land, given its smaller patrol craft and requirements for navy surveillance and logistics support.
- *Romania* relies heavily on its navy but also maintains a Border Navy (or *Granicerii*) under its Ministry of the Interior. Romanian

naval officials initially expressed the least amount of interest in traditional USCG missions. However, as *Dallas's* visit progressed, the Romanians indicated specific areas of interest, including rescue and assistance and interdiction of smugglers and the flow of illegal refugees. Their border navy is involved in interdicting the flow of gasoline smuggling into former Yugoslavia on the Danube as part of UN sanctions (no details were available).

- *Turkey* already maintains a fairly well-developed coast guard, in addition to its navy, with missions very similar to those of the USCG. These include countering smuggling, protecting cultural and natural treasures, conducting search and rescue, observing and inspecting navigational aids, conducting safety and customs inspections, supervising fisheries, and supporting the navy in times of war (and in anti-insurgency operations). There is a strong interest in strengthening Turkish Coast Guard aviation.
- *Tunisia* also has a fairly well-developed coast guard (*Service Nationale Surveillance Cotiere (SNSC)*), which is organized within its navy. Again, their missions are similar to those of the USCG. These include fisheries protection (in response to Italian vessels), immigration control, counter-terrorism, smuggling, rescue and assistance, safety and customs inspections, and a strong interest in pollution control/response to protect its tourist industry.
- *Slovenia's* maritime missions are spread among various agencies including its navy, army (for SAR), maritime police, and port authorities. The missions are coastal in nature and include maritime interdiction (mostly immigrants from former Yugoslavia as well as contraband), search and rescue, vessel inspection, and pollution control/response.
- *Italy* maintains a well-developed coast guard, in addition to its navy, whose peacetime missions fall under the Ministry of Transportation. This includes law enforcement, interdiction (mostly of Albanian refugees), fisheries protection, and pollution control/response. Italy also maintains military police and

customs forces with maritime missions, but representatives were not included in discussions. The Italian Navy and Coast Guard's participation in the bilateral SAREX with *Dallas* reinforced their interest in search and rescue.

- *Albania's* navy is responsible for all peacetime and wartime maritime missions. It is concerned primarily with interdiction (the flow of refugees to Italy), fisheries protection, pollution control and response, and search and rescue. Naval personnel also act as port and harbor inspectors.

## Host nation audience

In most countries, *Dallas* met with personnel from a wide variety of organizations. Most of them have had very little interaction with previous USN ship visits. They include:

- *Maritime border guard or border navy (Bulgaria and, to a lesser extent, Romania).* Under the control of the Ministry of the Interior in both countries, they are responsible for interdiction of smuggling on in-land waters and near shore. Both are organized to support the navy in times of war. Bulgarian maritime police were heavily involved during *Dallas's* visit, both in discussions and in planning and conducting the PASSEX.
- *Police/Maritime Police (Slovenia).* Very similar to a small coast guard or maritime border guard, these forces are under control of the Ministry of Interior and are concerned with interdiction and vessel safety. The maritime police were heavily involved in *Dallas's* visit to Slovenia in terms of numbers of personnel and participation in in-port and underway events.
- *Coast Guards (Turkey, Tunisia, and Italy).* While in Turkey, *Dallas* personnel interacted almost completely with Turkish coast guard rather than navy personnel. It should be noted, though, that Turkey's coast guard comprises navy personnel on two- to three-year tours. The Tunisian Coast Guard is essentially a squadron within the Tunisian Navy. *Dallas* interacted with both general navy and coast guard personnel during the visit to Bizerte, Tunisia.



- *Port Authority/Harbor Master (Slovenia)*. Under control of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, these entities focus on pollution control/response and rescue and assistance in and around the port. Several personnel attended in-port discussions and observed the PASSEX from aboard their own vessels.
- *Customs (Slovenia)*. Customs agencies exist in several of the countries visited. Their representatives actively participated in discussions with *Dallas* personnel in Slovenia. In Albania, the navy assumes these duties. Bulgaria depends on the State Inspection of Vessels Agency, which was not represented during the visit (for reasons unknown).
- *Air Force and Army (Albania and Slovenia)*. Air forces and armies handle SAR responsibilities and were represented in several of *Dallas's* Mil-to-Mil events. Air force personnel attended in-port discussions in Albania. In Slovenia, army personnel flew in a helo to demonstrate their own capabilities. The pilots then held discussions on SAR with *Dallas's* embarked Aviation Detachment (AVDET).
- *Navies (all)*. *Dallas* personnel interacted a great deal with naval personnel in each country. In Slovenia, the navy is extremely small and shares responsibilities with other agencies. In Albania, the navy handles all maritime responsibilities. (Even the Chief Inspector of Durres Harbor is a Capt 1st Rank in Albania's navy.) In Romania and Bulgaria, the navy is the dominant maritime service but other agencies do exist (maritime border guard/police and State Inspection of Shipping Agency). In almost every country, the navy played an important part in coastal/littoral missions. As previously mentioned, Italy, Turkey, and Tunisia maintain navies that focus on warfighting in addition to coastal or police forces similar to the USCG, so interaction with naval personnel in these countries was less extensive than elsewhere.

## Ongoing debates over maritime forces/organization

The fact that most of these countries are witnessing debates over the future of their maritime forces reinforces the “fit” of the cutter visit as a regional engagement tool. This provided an environment in which the cutter, according to U.S. Country Team and foreign personnel, was seen by most as an ideal model for their own maritime development. Although it is difficult to gauge the seriousness of these debates, the following bullets summarize the foreign debates and the nature and frequency in which they arose in discussions.

- In *Turkey*, there was a debate regarding the autonomy and responsibilities of the coast guard relative to the navy. The USCG was viewed as a model for a more independent coast guard. The Turkish Coast Guard Commander spent considerable time discussing this debate and relating it to *Dallas's* visit and his intentions for stronger relations with the USCG. In *Tunisia*, arguments for a more autonomous coast guard were mentioned by junior officers, but were less apparent.
- In *Bulgaria*, the debate over the future of its maritime forces centered on refocusing its navy to fulfill the growing coastal and littoral missions. VADM Kontrov, Bulgarian CNO, admitted that greater independence could be granted to Bulgaria's maritime border guard and other state agencies, but that these lacked the authority and budget to be effective. What is more likely is that the navy will support or take responsibility for various coastal missions. This was reinforced in discussions with mid- and junior-grade officers. The Bulgarian Navy has also recently requested information on the French Navy—which combines coastal and blue water responsibilities—as another potential model.
- *Albania* lacks the resources to support several maritime agencies. There is a recognition that the navy must change its focus to include its various coastal responsibilities, but there was no indication of a significant debate concerning these missions or the appropriate organization with which to carry them out.
- *Slovenia* is essentially starting from scratch and developing a maritime force consistent with its perceived threats and inter-

ests. The USCG was seen as a model for the future development of Slovenia's maritime forces. U.S. Country Team and MLT personnel indicated that there was a significant debate regarding the division of responsibilities between the maritime police (Ministry of the Interior) and the navy (Ministry of Defense).

- Despite the fact that *Romania* is undergoing significant political and social change since its revolution, there was no mention of a debate over the organization or focus of its naval forces.
- *Italian* Coast Guard personnel mentioned only minor bureaucratic arguments with their customs and military police agencies. Legislation in the last several years has better defined the relationship between Italy's navy and coast guard.

### **Other related interaction (with USCG and USN)**

In several countries, there were other events or discussions, often involving the USCG, which related to, contributed to, and benefitted from *Dallas's* visit. These related events (outlined below) point to a degree of synergy concerning USCG involvement in helping develop foreign maritime forces:

- At the time of *Dallas's* visit in *Albania* there was a legal conference co-sponsored by the USCG Office of Chief Counsel, which included officers from Albania, Ukraine, *Romania*, and *Bulgaria*. The seminar participants observed *Dallas's* MIO module and received tours of the ship.
- *Albania* and *Slovenia* have recently sent senior-level personnel to USCG facilities in the U.S., often sponsored by the USCG's International Affairs Branch (G-CI). This has included tours of USCG Head Quarters, Reserve Training Center (RTC) Yorktown, VA, and Support Center Portsmouth, VA (USCG, 5th District). Foreign personnel have also recently visited USCG facilities unrelated to this G-CI program. Several of the personnel *Dallas* interacted with had participated in these tours and were familiar with USCG organization.
- Security assistance and the possibility of transferring patrol craft (possibly USCG cutters) was an important topic in *Albania*.

*Dallas's* visit was preceded by that of USS *Sirocco* (a 170-foot patrol craft), which reinforced the importance of coastal missions and responsibilities and generated good interaction with the Albanian Navy. In *Bulgaria*, USCG personnel had already visited to assess coastal patrol craft needs and suggest changes to infrastructure.

- *Turkey* has hosted several USCG law enforcement training teams or fisheries enforcement training teams.

### **Immediate consequences from *Dallas's* visit**

In several countries, immediate impact from *Dallas's* visit was evident. Although longer-term consequences from the cutter visit are difficult to predict, these immediate effects contribute to the argument that the cutter was an appropriate Mil-to-Mil tool.

- In *Slovenia*, *Tunisia*, *Turkey*, and *Romania*, maritime personnel indicated interest in sending their students to the USCG Academy, the National SAR School, and other courses.
- There were also requests for high-level officer visits, as in the case of *Dallas's* visit to *Turkey*.
- Both U.S. Country Team and foreign personnel in several countries indicated an interest in future USCG visits.
- Since the *Dallas* deployment, the *Bulgarian* CNO, VADM Kontrov, has asked to meet with Coast Guard personnel while in the U.S. attending the International Seapower Symposium.
- After *Dallas's* visit to *Bulgaria*, the U.S. Ambassador responded by message that the visit was a "resounding" success and that the Coast Guard has the potential to play an important role in his country strategy. He has directed his staff to pursue opportunities for follow-on contact with the USCG.

## The cutter as a form of discreet presence

The second rationale COMSIXTHFLT used to justify *Dallas*'s deployment argued that the cutter provides a more acceptable, more discreet form of U.S. presence than does a highly visible combatant visit.

However, this argument was not tested since it applies to countries where the USN has been unsuccessful in developing interaction because of political or military sensitivities. *Dallas* visited countries that maintain active relationships with the USN. Several of the countries are NATO partners with which we maintain excellent political and military relations. In the case of Turkey, there have been temporary adjustments to USN ship visits in the wake of political or military circumstances, but U.S. Country Team personnel did not foresee dramatic changes. In Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania, there is a strong interest in increased political and economic ties to the West, and USN ship visits are part of that equation. In these countries, there was little concern about the political "baggage" inherent with a high-profile USN presence. Country Team personnel in these countries responded that high-profile flagship or combatant visits were more valuable because of the publicity and the implications of U.S. commitment.

A better test of this hypothesis would involve sending a cutter to a country where there has been no interaction with the USN and where significant political and military sensitivities exist. The Coast Guard maintains such ties in the Caribbean. It is entirely possible that the Coast Guard can initiate low-level interaction with other countries as well.

There were only two cases where the argument was even mentioned as a potential factor:

- In Tunisia, the U.S. Ambassador and Naval Attaché felt that, given Tunisia's role in the OAS and its relations with Muslim governments, there could be times when high-profile USN visits might be inappropriate. However, Tunisia currently maintains an active relationship with the USN, and U.S. Country Team personnel did not expect any changes.

- In Slovenia, the U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) responded that there have been some concerns about visits by large ship (e.g., a big-deck amphibious ship) because the city of Koper is unable to absorb that many U.S. personnel. However, this is not related to political or military sensitivities, which is an implicit part of the argument. SIXTHFLT can use smaller assets for engagement if size or draft is a primary consideration—a cutter is not the only option.

## Summary of *Dallas's* regional engagement success

The factors described above—similarity in missions, composition and size of audience, existence of ongoing debates concerning maritime forces, existence of ongoing or recent USCG-related events, extent to which immediate impact was evident—help define the level of suitability or “fit” of the cutter visit for regional engagement. The existence of several of these factors indicates that the cutter (and USCG expertise) was appropriate given foreign maritime organizations and missions, and was opportune given ongoing maritime debates and the existence of other related USCG interaction. Every factor need not be present with each country to signify an appropriate or successful visit. Table 1 shows that a large number of factors do exist in many of these countries.

The ability of the USCG to interact with and affect a variety of maritime organizations in addition to the navy supports the argument that the cutter is a unique regional engagement tool. Although the USN does have expertise in areas such as MIO and SAR, the focus is inherently military and different from the USCG. Furthermore, the USCG maintains expertise in areas such as traffic management, aids to navigation, and environmental response that the USN does not. (The appendix includes more detail as to the specific findings in each country as well as the previous level and type of USN interaction in these countries.)

Table 1. Rough measures of "fit" in each country

Country	Similarity in missions/ interests	Broad/diverse audience	Ongoing debates re. maritime forces	Other related interaction	Immediate consequences from visit	Cutter required as more discreet form of presence?
Romania	✓	—	—	✓	✓	—
Turkey	✗	—	✓	✓	✗	—
Bulgaria	✓	✓	✗	✓	—	—
Tunisia	✓	✓	—	—	✗	✓ <sup>a</sup>
Slovenia	✓	✗	✗	✓	—	✓ <sup>a</sup>
Italy	✓	—	—	—	✓	—
Albania	✓	✓	—	✗	✗	—

—	Not apparent in discussions
✓	Mentioned in discussions
✗	Significant factor in discussions

a. See section titled "The cutter as a form of discreet presence," pg.20.

## Other related issues/lessons learned

### Requirement for planning/preparation

In several cases, foreign personnel did not initially understand the USCG, how it was different from the USN, and how this difference related to their forces and missions. Relevant actors such as border navies, port authorities, and other organizations were not officially included in events and discussions.

For the first several visits, *Dallas* developed a detailed set of discussion modules and attempted to schedule all nine during the course of the visit. It soon became obvious that this overwhelmed several of the countries, either in their ability to fill the modules or in their interest of the particular subjects. Eventually, *Dallas* scheduled only those

modules in which foreign personnel expressed particular interest during initial discussions the morning *Dallas* arrived

Some of these misunderstandings—both in foreign perceptions and understanding of the USCG and in the USCG's understanding of foreign interests—indicate a requirement for better pre-planning and preparation. Because of the short notice of *Dallas*'s deployment, COMLANTAREA relied on a USCG liaison officer to visit each country several weeks in advance (usually for a couple days) to plan the Mil-to-Mil interaction. This officer would also arrive in port just prior to *Dallas*'s arrival to provide liaison between U.S. and foreign personnel. He would then fly to the next port in advance of *Dallas*'s arrival.

This liaison was absolutely essential. However, more substantial preparation should include country strategies developed well ahead of time by relevant USCG, USN, Country Team, Military Liaison Team (MLT), and foreign personnel. In addition, detailed scheduling should occur several weeks in advance of the visit. Such a planning schedule would help ensure that:

- Foreign navies understand the USCG and the cutter's role.
- All relevant parties are involved.
- USCG personnel understand the countries' maritime organization, interests, and limitations so they can best structure Mil-to-Mil events and discussions.

#### **PASSEX preparation**

To structure PASSEXes, *Dallas* had to meet with foreign maritime personnel to identify their interests, establish a timeline and communications script, and obtain approval by COMSIXTHFLT. This all had to happen in less than three days. SIXTHFLT maintains a publication with pre-approved PASSEXes covering a range of areas. This reduces the bureaucratic burden of developing and approving the PASSEX on short notice. The Coast Guard might consider creating such a publication. SIXTHFLT could also add several PASSEX scenarios based on coast guard missions to its own publication. (*Dallas*'s work in this area has already provided several exercises for future use.) More substantial preparation as described above might also assist in the development of these PASSEXes.



## What size cutter is best for regional engagement?

The WHEC is a good platform for regional engagement, given its:

- Crew size and range of expertise represented aboard the cutter
- Embarked helo
- Size and space for hosting foreign personnel in discussions and receptions
- Endurance for long transits, fewer fueling requirements in theater, and greater logistics self-sufficiency.

However, consideration might be given to smaller cutters due to the use of small coastal patrol craft in these countries. Several foreign personnel responded that they were impressed by *Dallas's* capabilities but that they were interested in purchasing or leasing smaller vessels. Table 2 lists the type of vessels used by the maritime forces for coastal/littoral missions in those countries visited. It does not represent a complete listing of vessels, but rather most of the primary surface vessel classes and their sizes. What the table shows is that these countries rely heavily on 70- to 200-foot patrol craft of various types.

A medium endurance cutter (WMEC) is a 210-foot or 270-foot cutter that might support COMSIXTHFLT's objectives and still have a relatively sophisticated communications suite, an embarked helo, and the ability to deploy to the Med and Black Sea. WMECs have been used successfully in USCG visits in Latin America and in the annual UNITAS exercise with Latin American navies. With a WMEC, the USCG could demonstrate equipment that is directly relevant to and can more easily be supported by these country's forces, possibly expanding security assistance relationships.

A primary advantage to using a WHEC versus WMEC is the former's ability to participate in battle group operations. The WMEC lacks the communications suite and combat data (LINK) systems of the WHEC. It also lacks the speed required to steam with battle group assets. However, if battle group exercises and operations are not a major focus of the cutter's deployment, the WMEC can contribute to regional engagement and is a viable option for regional engagement.

Table 2. Type/size of vessels used for Coast Guard functions in the countries *Dallas* visited<sup>a</sup>

Country	Vessels (class)	Type	Size (length in ft.)
Romania	Marasesti	DDG	474
	TETAL	FF	303
	Tarantul	Corvette	184
	Shanghai & OSA	Patrol Craft	127
	Huchuan	Patrol Craft	75
Bulgaria	Koni	FF	316
	Tarantul II	Corvette	184
	Letyashti & PAUK	Corvette	196
	OSA & ZHUK	Patrol Craft	79-127
Turkey	Large PCs	Patrol Craft	95-132
	SAR 33/35	Patrol Craft	108-120
	Coastal PCs	Patrol Craft	45-47
	Harbor PCs	Patrol Craft	60
Tunisia	Combattante	Patrol Craft	184
	Bizerte	Patrol Craft	158
	Shanghai	Patrol Craft	127
	Coastal PCs	Patrol Craft	83-104
Slovenia	Coastal/Harbor	Patrol Craft	@60
Italy (ITCG)	Minerva	Corvette	284
	Cassiopea	Corvette	72
	SAR Craft	Patrol Craft	75-90
	Fast PCs	Patrol Craft	45
Albania	Huchuan & PO2	Patrol Craft	72
	Shanghai	Patrol Craft	127
	ARCOR 25	Harbor PC	25
USCG	Hamilton	WHEC	378
	Bear	WMEC	270
	Reliance	WMEC	210

a. Italian and Turkish navies maintain much larger and more capable destroyers and frigates, but these are not routinely used for to accomplish coast guard functions. All data from *Jane's Fighting Ships*, 1995.

### Is a cutter visit necessary (compared to other forms of interaction)?

A significant question remaining is the extent to which a cutter visit is necessary, compared to other methods (e.g., staff talks, mobile training teams, or liaison personnel on the ground) for teaching USCG techniques and procedures, as well as fostering discussion.

Tangible reasons for using a cutter as a regional engagement tool include the following:

- The cutter provides a method of initiating interaction between the USCG and developing maritime forces. *Dallas* went into these ports without knowing exactly what these maritime forces were interested in. The cutter provided expertise in a number of coast guard missions (e.g., the aviation detachment, boarding team members, damage control teams, engineers with experience on diesels, gas turbines, and outboard motors.). *Dallas* personnel could interact and respond to a variety of foreign concerns and interests.
- The cutter allowed for successful PASSEXes and underway demonstrations that applied in-port discussions in an operational environment. In Romania, Bulgaria, and Tunisia, *Dallas* got under way and conducted almost a full day of demonstrations including interdiction, rescue and assistance, and search and rescue using the embarked helo. *Dallas* served as the platform for launching boarding and damage control teams. It also had space and personnel to cross-deck with foreign officers. (*Dallas* usually accommodated between 5 and 15 foreign personnel during the PASSEXes and the SAREX.)
- It also provides a ready source of space in which to hold these discussions (and receptions). Its wardroom, chief's mess, helo deck and hangar, and other areas provided enough space to hold several discussions at once.

Intangible reasons for using a cutter versus other methods of engagement include the following:

- The cutter contributes to overall U.S. presence to a greater extent than USCG personnel on the ground. U.S. Country Team personnel responded that behind the visits of VIPs, flagships, and very capable ships (carriers and amphibious ships), visits such as that of *Dallas* are a valuable means of expressing a commitment on the part of the U.S. and recognizing the legitimacy of particular countries through tangible signs of approval. Although part of the rationale for using the cutter in

the first place was that it was a more discreet form of presence, U.S. Country Team personnel responded that government, the military, and local officials still noted *Dallas's* visit. In most ports, *Dallas* also met with considerable press coverage and public response (in all cases except Tunisia and Italy).

- The cutter visit helps promote U.S. military sales and technical assistance. In each country, foreign personnel expressed interest in specific equipment and capabilities, including larger items such as *Dallas's* embarked helo and its hoisting capabilities, *Dallas's* small boats (particularly the rigid hull inflatable), communications gear (including hand-held radios and GPS receivers), drug test kits, video technologies for searching enclosed spaces on ships, and pumps and hoses for damage control teams. These specific areas of interest, brought about by *Dallas's* visit, can be pursued by training teams or individual personnel.

It is possible that engagement can be accomplished through means other than a cutter visit. Training teams and liaison visits can address a specific concern at a more detailed level. For instance, Bulgaria's naval aviators were interested in developing hoisting techniques aboard their helos. The USCG could send a technical assistance team (possibly funded through security assistance) or support Bulgarian students at U.S. aviation-related schools (through IMET). The legal conference, held at the time of *Dallas's* visit to Albania, was an excellent vehicle for discussing maritime law enforcement issues. Although the conference most likely benefitted from *Dallas's* involvement (the conference attendees observed the MIO discussion module), the cutter was not a necessary element.

Still, the cutter provided a broad introduction to the missions, expertise, and organization of the USCG and reached a wide audience. It also enhanced U.S. presence in various countries.

## WHEC-battle group exercises/operations

When *Dallas* was not operating independently in its Peacetime Engagement operations, it was included in exercises and operations with battle group assets during three periods:

- 12-14 June with COMDESRON TWO TWO embarked on USS *Ticonderoga*. (This replaced the originally scheduled participation in BETACOM/POOPDECK series of exercises, which would have included battle group and MARG assets.)
- 17-19 June with COMCARGRU EIGHT embarked on USS *Theodore Roosevelt*
- 29-30 July with COMCARGRU EIGHT and COMDESRON TWO TWO.

At all other times, *Dallas* maintained communications with and depended on logistics support from COMSIXTHFLT.

Exercises were taken from COMCARGRU EIGHT training packages (TRAPACs), which facilitate the participation of various units without numerous pre-exercise messages and coordination. Specific exercises included:

- Publication exercises (PUBEXes)
- Communications drills (including semaphore, flashing light, and flag hoist; establishing and shifting HF and UHF for voice circuits and combat data transmission; and deception and jamming)
- Tactical signals and maneuvering (including leap frogs)
- LINK and detect to engage drills
- EMCON and satellite vulnerability drills
- 76-mm and CIWS PACFIRES.

Under the OPCON of CTF-60, *Dallas* was also involved in Adriatic operations with COMCARGRU EIGHT including:

- SH-60 and HH-65A operations. *Dallas* was used as a deck of opportunity for Navy helos. (The WHEC is the smallest certified flight deck for the SH-60, and *Dallas* provided an opportunity for Navy pilots to maintain their deck-landing qualifications.) *Dallas's* embarked HH-65A was able to land aboard *Theodore Roosevelt* on one occasion.
- CV escort and plane guard.
- Functioning as Commander Task Group (CTG) 68.1 during Black Sea Peacetime Engagement operations. Although this is primarily a designation, it does include additional reporting requirements.

## Operational utility of the WHEC

The previous paragraphs outlined the specific exercises and operations in which *Dallas* participated. This section assesses the operational contributions of *Dallas* within the battle group.

### *Dallas's* contributions in the Med

*Dallas's* participation in exercises and its operational contributions were limited by its weapons and sensors (minimal air and surface defense and no ASW capabilities). As mentioned above, *Dallas's* primary responsibility while in the Adriatic was CV escort. Frigates are often assigned CV escort, and they have the added responsibility of inner-screen with their air defense and ASW capabilities. If required, the carrier steams without an escort during normal operations. Thus, we can characterize *Dallas's* operational contributions as supplementary rather than complementary, given the following distinction:

- **Supplementary** forces contribute the same or similar capabilities as other forces. Instead of new capabilities, the supplementary force provides already existing capabilities, which may be roughly interchangeable.

- **Complementary** forces provide capabilities that did not previously exist within a particular force and that enhance the overall effectiveness of the force.

This does not mean that the WHEC is purely a supplementary asset as far as battle group operations. Rather, during this particular deployment *Dallas* supplemented the battle group's already-existing capabilities. The WHEC possesses capabilities which, depending on the circumstances and requirements, can complement battle group assets. Two primary examples include:

- *MIO coordination and participation.* The training and expertise of their boarding teams is more extensive than that of USN vessels (reinforced by the fact that the USCG maintains personnel qualification standards for boarding team officers and members while the USN does not). Navy SEALs do have expertise in interception operations, but this is in specialized opposed boardings. In interception operations off the U.S. Coast (i.e., counter-narcotics or alien migration), Coast Guard personnel are required because of their ability to enforce U.S. federal law.
- *SAR planning and execution.* Navy SAR is focused on battle group operations (including CSAR). The Coast Guard has considerable experience in SAR planning and in the rescue and assistance of merchant or refugee vessels. The Coast Guard relies heavily on coordination among merchant ships and ports as well as programs that take into account target drift over potentially long periods of time.

Other areas of USCG expertise (such as port safety/security and environmental survey and response) are not normally maintained aboard the cutter but can complement naval operations when required.

#### **Why *Dallas's* capabilities were not used to a greater extent**

There are several reasons why the cutter's capabilities were not used to a greater extent while operating in the Adriatic:

- There are currently strict limitations placed on the number and activities of U.S. vessels in Operation Sharp Guard.

- There are enough USN and allied surface assets in the region for interdiction operations.
- The Navy's organic SAR assets (as well as Marine Corps, SOCCOM, and allied assets) are sufficient for battle group flight operations.

## ***Dallas* deployment as a test of Battle Group interoperability**

Because the exercises and operations in which *Dallas* participated were limited in nature, its Med deployment does not represent a demanding test of WHEC-battle group interoperability. It is not clear from *Dallas*'s deployment whether problems related to interoperability would arise under a more demanding scenario. A more extensive test of interoperability could be gained by including a WHEC in USN FLEETEXes with a higher tempo of operations and a more demanding (albeit artificial) threat. It should be noted that *Dallas*'s originally scheduled participation in the BETACOM/POOPDECK exercises might have provided more data as far as WHEC-battle group/MARG interoperability, but this was cancelled just prior to *Dallas*'s in-chop. This exercise might have placed *Dallas* in a more demanding multi-ship environment (including NATO assets).

In the exercises and operations in which *Dallas* participated, there were no substantial problems. The cutter maintained communications, passed combat systems data and tactical signals, kept SIXTHFLT informed regarding its Mil-to-Mil operations, and received logistics support successfully. Several SIXTHFLT personnel commented that the fact that *Dallas* was not a battle group asset was "transparent" and that the cutter did not present a burden in terms of extra support. Their overall performance was comparable to regular battle group assets. This deployment went a long way in breaking down assumptions that the WHEC could not keep pace with battle group operations and would present an added burden. Nonetheless, there were several interoperability issues experienced during the deployment that raise concerns about WHEC-battle group interoperability.



## Tactical signals and maneuvering

There were no problems as far as maneuvering with the battle group using tactical signals from ATP-1 as well as guidance on plane guard duties from USS *Theodore Roosevelt*. *Dallas* was praised for a "textbook" fueling and emergency break-away drill with USNS *Big Horn*. Other replenishments were conducted without difficulty over the course of the deployment with USNS *Leroy Grumman*, *Saturn*, and *Sirius*. *Dallas* relied on and was familiar with NWP 14, *Replenishment at Sea*.

## Communications

### Combat data

Historically, cutters have focused on monitoring and intercepting slow-moving surface vessels (e.g., migrant, fishing, drug vessels) using independent, single-vessel patrols. Officer in Tactical Command Information Exchange System (OTCIXS) was sufficient for a strategic tactical picture based upon contact data. Over the past several years, traditional Coast Guard missions have been supplemented with joint operations (such as *Able Vigil*, *Able Manner*, and response to DOD counter-drug detection and monitoring efforts in the Caribbean). This has increased the requirement to receive time-critical combat data (LINK 11) from DOD assets.

*Dallas*'s LINK-11 configuration including a DTC2 computer did present some problems by limiting the type and sophistication of exercises it could participate in. In terms of actual operations, *Dallas* would have to rely heavily on voice reporting to receive and transmit air tracks. However, operationally, it is unlikely that there will be a real requirement for the cutter to enter tracks into the LINK as far as battle group tactical purposes (given its sensor limitations). This does not mean that there are no LINK-11 requirements for the cutter. There is an operational need to receive LINK tracks and to potentially transmit tracks in scenarios such as counter-narcotics. Specific software limitations included the fact that *Dallas*:

- Could not report real-time tracks via LINK-11 (with the exception of its own track)

- Could not send detailed track identifiers, resulting in a low track quality
- Could not receive special track identifiers, which are more detailed descriptions of a contact, and cover orders.

Most of these problems should be solved with the next generation of Shipboard Command and Control System (SCCS)—a Joint Maritime Command Information System (JMCIS) integrated LINK-11 system that will surpass current CG LINK/OTCIXS configurations. This version is slated for installation on all WHECs beginning in FY 1996.

### **Voice**

Voice communications between *Dallas* and battle group assets presented no substantial problems. The exercises emphasized establishing and changing UHF frequencies as well as recognizing and combatting net deception. *Dallas's* communications suite is similar to that of a FFG-7 and is full duplex DAMA-capable. *Dallas* was outfitted with an additional ANDVT before its deployment. This was not an operational requirement, but it did allow greater situational awareness by allowing *Dallas* to monitor MEDSATHICOM and CTF-60 CMD NET at the same time. (Previously, only one satellite circuit could be monitored.) *Dallas* could maintain all tactically significant HF, UHF, and satellite circuits as per CTF-60 OPTASK COMMS (although it did have to drop those not used to bring up other circuits as necessary).

### **Message traffic**

Probably the largest communications problem between *Dallas* and SIXTHFLT assets was the flow of message traffic. First, the cutter was not accustomed to the volume of traffic. Table 3 compares the total number of messages sent and received during the Med deployment with several previous *Dallas* deployments.

Table 3. Message totals in various *Dallas* deployments

Deployment	Sent	Received	Sent/received (per-day average)
Med (29May-28Aug 95)	1,482	18,866	16/205
Able Manner (2Feb-30Apr 93)	1,907	10,760	22/124
Able Manner & Strictly Business (18Jul-15Sep 93)	1,415	8,301	24/138
Able Vigil/Manner/Op Monsoon (5Sep-9Nov 94)	960	7,997	14/119

The WHEC also lacks the electronic message boards for storing, displaying, and writing messages, especially classified messages. The Coast Guard relies on a UNISYS system that does not recognize message text format—a format that helps catalog and store messages in databases. The cutter also lacked programs to check messages for errors in format and address. This resulted in a high manual intervention rate (MIR) where NCTAMS personnel must manually correct the message. Mid-way through the deployment, *Dallas* received a USCG version of the USN's Digital PLAD Verification System (DPVS) which provides this capability. Table 4 illustrates the improvement in *Dallas's* MIR once the program was installed.

Table 4. MIR during *Dallas* deployment<sup>a</sup>

Time frame	MIR percentage
Pre-DPVS	
1-15 June	15.17
16-30 June	21.00
Post-DPVS	
1-15 July	10.12 <sup>b</sup>
16-31 July	5.05

a. The standard intervention rate for SIXTH-FLT assets is 5 percent.

b. *Dallas* received the DPVS program nearly mid-way through this period.

### Standard computer systems

An underlying problem with the flow of message traffic and electronic message boards is that the USCG does not use PC-based hard-

ware and software compatible with the Navy. Messages and supporting documents provided on disk by Navy personnel could not be easily accessed. The USCG is planning to buy PC-compatible computers in the coming years, which should alleviate many of these problems.

## Logistics support

Logistics support of *Dallas*, while deployed to SIXTHFLT, did not pose any considerable problems. *Dallas* used the standard casualty reporting procedures (CASREP) and reported equipment, fueling, and replenishment requirements through CTF 63 (as well as informing LANTAREA). All logistics guidance was taken from COMSERV-FORSIXTHFLT INST 4000.1R. CTF 63 was able to respond to a number of *Dallas's* logistics concerns, especially in those cases in which the part was standard to USN vessels. In several cases, *Dallas* received technical assistance or parts from USN vessels nearby. Specific problems in which SIXTHFLT logistics infrastructure assisted *Dallas* are listed below (the time delay (in days) to deliver the needed parts is indicated wherever possible):

- Mk 92 Thyatron; 4 days
- WLR-1H band nine amplifier; 4 to 5 days
- CIWS Mk 15 parts/equipment; 1 day to receive part with second CASREP (first involved technical assist via INMARSAT)
- SPS-40B radar parts/equipment; 4 days
- HF amplifier; 4 days.

In other instances, *Dallas* required Coast Guard-specific parts that CTF-63 could not obtain in theater. In these cases, *Dallas* worked with Commander Atlantic Area (COMLANTAREA) and Maintenance Logistics Command Atlantic (MLC LANT) to find and track the part and get it to Norfolk for an AMC flight to Rota. Commander Fleet Air Mediterranean (COMFAIRMED) would then transport it within the theater. In other instances, *Dallas* waited to receive and install the part until after the deployment because the part was too cumbersome to ship or was not mission essential. These parts included:

- HH-65A flight SERVO (received in theater); 5 days
- Main reduction gear steam heater (post deployment)
- Air conditioner unit (received in theater); 32 days
- Commissary hoist (post deployment); part was intended to meet *Dallas* in Rota, Spain, but was not received
- HH-65A windshield (received in theater); 8 days
- Power autotransformer for helo deck perimeter lights; 28 days (part failed to meet *Dallas* in several ports).

These instances concerning USCG-unique parts were more difficult since *Dallas* had to work through MLC LANT and COMLANTAREA to find the part and get it into theater, and then coordinate through CTF 63 to forward it to the cutter. Although this sample is small, it would appear that USCG-unique parts take much longer to arrive than USN parts already in-theater. It should be noted, though, that several of these parts were more difficult to transport because of size, the fact that they were not mission essential, or that they were requested during *Dallas's* Mil-to-Mil visits in the Black Sea where it is more difficult to receive support.

Generally, there were no major problems and *Dallas* was able to obtain parts and assistance when required. Future cutter deployments will benefit from *Dallas's* lessons learned.

## Embarked HH-65A

*Dallas's* embarked HH-65A played an important role in the deployment, both in terms of Mil-to-Mil discussions and PASSEXes and logistical support. As mentioned in the regional engagement section, the helo and embarked AVDET were successful in cultivating interaction with foreign personnel. It was a major factor in almost every PASSEX and included demonstrations of search patterns and rescue swimmer deployments. Logistically, it helped deliver mail and transfer personnel requiring medical assistance.

However, the helo did present several interoperability concerns since it is not standard to the USN:

- To begin with, the HH-65A offers very little to the battle group in terms of operational contributions. It is a short-range SAR asset and is not designed for CSAR or any military threat environment. It currently lacks night vision technology as well as combat data link and any sort of weaponry. It also has a limited lift capacity compared to the SH-60. The helo was able to land aboard *Theodore Roosevelt* on one occasion and encountered no substantive problems with its communications or its use of CV Naval Aviation Training and Operating Procedures (NATOPS) procedures.
- HH-65As are not normally equipped with Mode IV transponders, which flight operations in the Adriatic require. Air Training Command (ATC) Mobile arranged to have a Mode IV transponder installed prior to the deployment.
- There were logistical burdens associated with this USCG-unique aircraft deployed to the EUCOM AOR. On two occasions, the helo required parts (a windshield and flight servo) which had to be shipped from the United States. *Dallas* could embark with only about 35 percent of the helicopter support kit (HSK), and these specific parts were not included. Added delays resulted in an inoperable airframe that fouled the flight deck and prevented all flight operations.
- Flight opportunities were limited because of casualties to the airframe and weather conditions, but also due to *Dallas's* tight Mil-to-Mil schedule, specifically the amount of time it spent:
  - In foreign ports
  - Within territorial seas or within international straits
  - While on a strict schedule to maintain a full Mil-to-Mil schedule.

The USN and USCG should consider embarking the USCG's HH-60J in future deployments that include battle group operations or are far from USCG logistical support. The HH-60J would be more easily supported through Navy logistics in theater. Another option involves staging additional supplies for the HH-65A on the ground in theater.

## Publications/in-chop process

*Dallas* was originally scheduled to in-chop with USS *LaSalle* upon reaching the Med, where it would be given the documentation (OPTASKs, supporting messages, etc.) for the deployment. However, this plan was cancelled due to the changing situation in the Adriatic.

Instead, *Dallas* was required to obtain much of this documentation informally, either from other ships while in-port in Rota or from the Navy (COMDESRON TWO TWO) liaison officer aboard *Dallas* during battle group exercises and operations. Some specific documents obtained included:

- CTF 60 OPTASKs and supporting messages
- COMSIXTHFLT OPORD 4000 and COMSERVFOR SIXTHFLT INST 4000.1R and supporting messages
- NATO ROE guidance
- COMCARGRU EIGHT TRAPACs.

*Dallas* personnel found that a lack of "corporate knowledge" of SIXTHFLT procedures and instructions caused the greatest demand on their time. The informal support given by other SIXTHFLT assets and liaison officers was invaluable in providing the operational and administrative guidance. In one instance, *Dallas* obtained COMCARGRU EIGHT TRAPACs just before exercises for which they were required. In the future, cutters would benefit from obtaining this administrative and operational guidance well in advance of such a deployment.

# Conclusions

## Cutter as a regional engagement tool

*Dallas's* Mil-to-Mil interaction with seven Med and Black Sea maritime forces was successful given the aim of COMSIXTHFLT's Peacetime Engagement Strategy to expand military-to-military interaction. Specific findings include the following:

- The cutter was a good match as far as the *missions* of these particular forces. These forces were keenly interested in such issues as MIO, SAR/rescue and assistance, and fisheries protection, and in the capabilities required to support these missions.
- Their naval/maritime forces include *vessels* closer in *size* to most Coast Guard cutters (between 70 and 200 feet) relative to most USN vessels that visit these ports. Furthermore, these forces are closer in *organizational size* and *structure* to the USCG relative to the USN. Several of the maritime forces fall under agencies/organizations other than their Ministries of Defense (or equivalent).
- The deployment reached a broad maritime *audience*, extending far beyond navy personnel to include police and maritime police, border guard, harbor master and port authority, and other service participation.
- There were ongoing debates in many of these countries regarding the future of their maritime forces—whether they require navies, coast guards, police forces, or any combination and how missions should be distributed among the various agencies. Several foreign personnel responded that they viewed the USCG as *a model in the development of foreign maritime forces*.
- The deployment also complemented the increasing level of interaction with and exposure to the USCG as well as USN assets with coastal/littoral missions. There was a high degree of



synergy between the cutter visit and other forms of interaction such as legal conferences, USN PC deployments, the possible transfer of U.S. PCs and cutters, senior officer visits, and USCG training teams.

- There were also specific requests for future cutter deployments, senior officer visits, student exchanges at USCGA, National SAR School, and RTC Yorktown, and security assistance in the form of PCs or cutters.

The cutter also contributes several concrete benefits that could not be gained by sending USCG personnel or training teams to these countries. It provided a platform on which to discuss a wide variety of missions and topics as well as the space for discussions and receptions. It was also absolutely essential to conducting PASSEXes and underway demonstrations in traditional coast guard missions. These PASSEXes were some of the most successful events as far as the interest and enthusiasm of foreign participants. Finally, Country Team personnel responded that the cutter—while a more discreet platform than many USN combatants—still acted as a form of presence and signified U.S. commitment. In most countries, *Dallas's* visit received considerable interest from the public, the press, and the military.

The bottom line is that COMSIXTHFLT has found a valuable “tool” for Peacetime Engagement, and the U.S. Coast Guard has broadened its own International Strategic Plan, which defines the Coast Guard’s objectives and alternatives as far as interaction with other countries.

The success of the cutter deployment to the SIXTHFLT AOR for regional engagement purposes raises the possibility of cutter deployments to other AORs. A cutter is scheduled to participate in BALTOPS 96 exercise and then deploy to the Mediterranean and Black Sea for regional engagement purposes next summer. CENTCOM has also requested a cutter deployment. The USCG already maintains a great deal of interaction in SOUTHCOM, including its participation in the annual UNITAS exercise.

## WHEC–battle group exercises/operations

In the case of *Dallas's* Mediterranean exercises and operations, the cutter played a limited operational role. Its battle group participation included CV escort and plane guard, providing a platform for SH-60 ops, conducting underway replenishments, maintaining communications, and receiving logistics support from SIXTHFLT. Exercises focused on basic communications and LINK exercises and tactical maneuvering. In this sense, the deployment offered only a limited test of WHEC–battle group interoperability. There was no participation with MARG assets as planned. More extensive tests could be gained by including the WHEC in fleet exercises (FLEETEXes) with a higher tempo of operations and a more demanding (albeit artificial) threat.

This being said, *Dallas* successfully operated and was interoperable with battle group assets at this level of involvement. Tactical maneuvering (during exercises and underway replenishment) was successful, as were communications in general.

A number of detailed interoperability issues became evident during the deployment, although none were operational “show-stoppers.” These include:

- Limitations concerning the current LINK configuration aboard *Dallas* (which should be addressed with the next-generation LINK configuration slated for installation)
- The flow of message traffic and the requirements for common message databases and boards and for a common computer system in general
- Logistics support for non-USN-standard parts
- Issues surrounding the USCG HH-65A
- The importance of an in-chop process for the non-battle group assets such as the cutter, which lack a normal work-up period.

These problems did not significantly affect overall interoperability, but it is not clear whether these or other areas would present more considerable challenges to interoperability under a more demanding scenario.

*Dallas's* deployment provides valuable lessons regarding the use of cutters for regional engagement and for potential battle group operations. The bottom line is that the Coast Guard maintains unique capabilities and expertise that can both supplement and complement the Navy and CINC objectives. The deployment is an important data point in a recently initiated CNA study concerning the national defense and diplomatic missions of the next-generation Coast Guard cutter.

## Appendix: Port visit information

### Romania (28 June–3 July)

1. Interviews and discussions were held with:

- RADM Ivancu (Chief of Operations, Romanian Naval Staff)
- Local government officials (including Mayor of Constanta and Prefect of Jurisdiction of Constanta)
- Mid-grade naval officers (CO/XO of MARASESTI and GROZAVUL; CAPT Paryu, Chief of Hydrographic Office; CAPT Pora, Dept. Chief of Hydrographic Office; several Romanian liaison officers (mid to junior-grade)
- U.S. Country Team personnel (Naval Attache and MLT representative)

2. **Cutter as a more discreet form of presence.** It quickly became obvious that Romania was not concerned with the cutter as a more discreet form of presence. Interviews and discussions with senior-mid-grade Romanian officer indicated an interest in a robust U.S. presence and high-profile USN ship visits as a sign of commitment. This was in part due to their:

- Interest in the Partnership for Peace and interest in joining NATO
- Fears of a resurgent Russia.

There were, in fact, signs that *Dallas's* visit was treated less seriously because it was not a flagship visit or another high-profile visit:

- VADM Angelescu was not present at any meetings as intended.
- Country team personnel felt that publicity within the Romanian Navy of *Dallas's* visit was less than that of higher profile

visits (recent and upcoming flagship visits or *Pensacola's* visit a month later).

**3. *Dallas's* Mil-to-Mil interaction.** There was little response at first to *Dallas's* Mil-to-Mil discussions. Romanian naval personnel showed little interest in the USCG and its missions and how the visit might apply to their own navy. Discussions included Intro to the USCG, MIO, damage control, and USCG aviation. Most of the discussion modules had very few participants, with the exception of the SAR module on the second day in-port, which met with considerable interest. Language barriers did present a problem and few translators were available.

PASSEX activities were planned during several meetings throughout the visit. On the second day in-port, personnel from the Romanian destroyer *Marasesti* requested communications, tactical signals, and other radio and flashing light drills with *Dallas*. They brought the script they had used in a PASSEX with USS *Doyle* in September 1994. There was some confusion during these drills—Romanian personnel did not respond to *Dallas* tactical signals—so it is difficult to evaluate their proficiency with EXTAC 1000. After another meeting outlining *Dallas's* expertise and capabilities that could be used in a PASSEX, Romanian personnel decided on a rescue and assistance scenario with their sea-going tug *Grozavul*. The PASSEX included *Grozavul* placing a diver in the water and *Dallas's* helo simulating a SAR pattern and then deploying a rescue swimmer to pick up the victim. Then *Dallas* simulated a fire on board and *Grozavul* responded by spraying water aft of *Dallas*. (There was interest in actually towing *Dallas* during the exercise but this did not occur.)

Interviews with U.S. Country Team personnel indicated that *Dallas* conducted more detailed Mil-to-Mil interaction than previous USN ship visits. In the previous months, USS *Kauffman* conducted limited discussions on safety and damage control and maritime interdiction. Their underway PASSEX focused on communications and tactical maneuvering using EXTAC 1000.

**4. Missions of their forces.** Their naval personnel were hesitant to discuss their coastal/littoral missions and focused instead on their Black Sea missions (against a resurgent Russia). The U.S. Naval Attaché and

several mid-grade Romanian officers explained that they viewed their Black Sea navy as a ticket into NATO and that a coastal/littoral focus would give them very little to offer NATO.

It did become evident that there were areas where *Dallas's* visit could benefit their forces. There was a strong interest in search and rescue, more specifically in rescue and assistance of vessels (as seen in the PASSEX with *Grozavul*). Two merchant ships were lost during a storm the previous winter, and there was an interest in bolstering their ability to respond to ships in distress. Also, there was some discussion of its border navy, which has responsibilities as far as smuggling on the Danube (fuel headed to the former Yugoslavia), but border navy personnel were not formally included in the meetings and in the official calls.

5. **Audience.** The audience *Dallas* reached in Romania was limited largely to its navy. During the week, *Dallas* personnel learned of several organizations with coastal responsibilities which were not included in discussions or in official calls. These included:

- The Romanian Border Navy (or Graniceri), which handles inland waterways and smuggling and other law enforcement duties.
- A civilian organization called G.I.S.M. under control of the port administration, which owns two vessels for rescue and assistance and SAR responsibilities.
- The General Manager of the port administration, who is responsible for rescue and assistance of vessels and pollution control and response in and around the port.

Future USCG or USN visits to Romania that focus on littoral/coastal missions should include these organizations if possible.

6. **Ongoing debates regarding the future of Romania's maritime forces.** There was some discussion of the growing importance of their coastal/littoral responsibilities by mid-junior grade personnel. However, interviews and discussions with senior personnel revealed little interest in such changes. The larger debate regarding the enormous changes to their nation in general did not seem to extend into a debate over their naval missions.

7. **Immediate consequences from *Dallas's* visit.** After several discussions with RADM Ivancu, there was interest expressed in possibly sending Romanian naval personnel to USCGA. The Naval Attache has pursued this issue since *Dallas's* visit, but Romania's fiscal constraints limit this possibility.

8. **Other related events ongoing.** Romanian naval officers were included in the maritime legal conference held in Durres, Albania, while *Dallas* was in port there. They participated in MIO discussion aboard *Dallas*. There has also been some past interaction with the USCG including law enforcement training team visits in April and September 1993, a courtesy call on the Commandant in Feb 1994, and a visit by Romanian police to Air Station Brooklyn in March 1995.

9. **Recent USN interaction.** There has been previous interaction in BREEZE and Maritime Partner exercises, annual flagship visits, the Amphibious demonstration this summer, Cooperative Partner planned for this fall, and individual ship visits. The May 1995 visit by USS *Kauffman* was one of the more detailed Mil-to-Mil visits by a USN asset in the region, including discussions on shipboard organization, damage control/rescue and assistance, and boarding and search procedures. Other recent ship visits have included USS *Radford*, *Portland*, *Grapple*, *Tortuga*, *Doyle*, and *Platte*.

10. **Comments.** There seemed to be two major lessons to *Dallas's* visit to Romania. First of all, there are indications that the Romanian Navy still is quite concerned with maintaining a Black Sea Navy that can deal with a resurgent Russia and contribute to its goal of NATO membership. At the same time, there was some interest in coast guard missions and capabilities (especially MIO and SAR). What was lacking was access to all concerned parties (e.g., its border navy, port administration, customs, etc.). There was also an indication that Romanian naval personnel did not understand the capabilities and interests of *Dallas* when it arrived. Planning several months in advance of *Dallas's* arrival might better prepare both the foreign personnel (to understand why the cutter visit should matter) and those aboard the cutter (to understand what the country expects/is interested in).

## Turkey (5–7 July)

### 1. Interviews and discussions were held with:

- RADM Canel, Commander Turkish Coast Guard (from previous Istanbul visit); BG Hayretin Uzun, Garrison Commander; CDR Yilman Guven, Acting Commander Coast Guard Black Sea Zone
- Governor and Mayor of Samsun
- Mid- and junior-grade Turkish Coast Guard officers including patrol boats COs and Black Sea HQ personnel
- Thomas Castle, Defense Attache Office representative; Maj Keith Davies, USMC (AALUSNA) during previous Istanbul visit

2. **Cutter as a more discreet form of presence.** The hypothesis that the cutter provides a more discreet form of presence where high-profile ship visits may not be appropriate was not tested here. The USN has a long history of ship visits and exercises with Turkey, a NATO partner. Past interruptions in ship visits because of political or military circumstances have been temporary in nature. Discussions indicated that few expected radical changes to USN interaction with Turkey. Furthermore, *Dallas* received considerable press coverage—something that U.S. Country Team personnel felt was usually limited to high-profile visits such as those made by an aircraft carrier. Thus, it was not clear from this visit, whether the cutter would escape scrutiny when combatant ships were inappropriate.

3. ***Dallas's* Mil-to-Mil interaction.** *Dallas's* Mil-to-Mil interaction with Turkey began on its mid-patrol break to Istanbul where *Dallas* personnel met with RADM Canel, Commander of the Turkish coast guard. Official calls in Samsun followed the same schedule as previous USN visits with local and regional government officials as well as military personnel. In the case of *Dallas*, there were additional meetings with coast guard personnel including the Deputy Commander for the Black Sea Area. (Samsun is the Black Sea HQ for their Coast Guard.)

Discussion modules included Intro to the USCG, SAR, and MIO. Approximately 16 *Dallas* personnel toured several Turkish patrol boats. This included *Dallas's* auxiliary engineering team, which discussed maintenance and water purification issues while on board.



Given the fact that the Turkish coast guard is relatively well-developed, interaction and discussions were at a more advanced level. MIO discussions included specific questions concerning our coast guard's relationship to local officials and customs agents as well as the potential for using force during such operations. In several cases, Turkish coast guard personnel explained the procedures they go through during various boarding scenarios.

There was no PASSEX because of the time constraints of developing the PASSEX on such short notice and having it approved by CTF-60 and COMSIXTHFLT.

Previous USN visits to Samsun include USS *Tortuga* (LPD) and USS *Peterson* to Samsun did not involve any similar Mil-to-Mil interaction and included only official calls and tours for the general public. U.S. Country Team as well as Turkish coast guard personnel responded that *Dallas's* Mil-to-Mil interaction was the most energetic they had seen.

**4. Missions of their forces.** The missions of the Turkish coast guard are very similar to those of the USCG. These missions include interdiction (from smuggling to Kurdish insurgents), fisheries protection, vessel traffic management and vessel safety, and search and rescue. There was specific interest during *Dallas's* visit to Istanbul concerning the development of a vessel traffic system (VTS) based largely on USCG techniques and procedures. There is also specific interest in strengthening their coast guard aviation assets. Their coast guard comes under control of the Minister of Transportation but supports the navy in times of war.

**5. Audience.** The audience in *Dallas's* visit to Turkey was limited largely to the coast guard (although official calls included local and regional government officials and a their Samsun Garrison Commander (BG Turkish Army)). The previous visit to Istanbul included a call on Turkish navy (Sea Area North) CAPT Metin Acimuz.

**6. Ongoing debates regarding the future of their maritime forces.** In Turkey, there is an attempt by the Turkish coast guard Commander to increase the size and autonomy of the coast guard in relation to the Navy. Turkish coast guard are naval personnel serving temporary tours (2-3 years) in the coast guard. RADM Canel (on *Dallas's* trip to Istanbul) mentioned that the Turkish Navy was not concerned

enough with its coastal missions and was too focused on procuring vessels that would support warfighting missions. He was concerned by the fact that he was not notified (through their navy) of *Dallas's* visit to Istanbul well in advance. He mentioned that he would have liked to turn this into a working visit. When the opportunity arose to get *Dallas* into Samsun, RADM Canel pushed and was successful in obtaining permission with only 72 hours' notice (including a weekend) when Turkey usually required 30 days' notice for such visits. The coast guard is also in the process of reorganizing the structure of its Black Sea forces. It is spreading its assets to three locations along the Black Sea: Samsun, Trabzon, Bartin.

**7. Immediate consequences from *Dallas's* visit.** The most immediate consequence from *Dallas's* visit was a request for a senior-level USCG officer visit to Turkey and stronger coast guard-coast guard relations in general. This request was made directly to *Dallas's* CO and others when speaking with RADM Canel as well as through the USDAO after *Dallas's* visit. Since *Dallas's* visit, USDAO Ankara has requested that ADM Kramek or another USCG Flag officer schedule a visit for bilateral coast guard talks.

**8. Other related events ongoing.** There were no events ongoing at the time of *Dallas's* visit, but the USCG has interacted with the Turkish Coast Guard in the past. This includes several law enforcement mobile training teams (1988, 94, 95) at the Turkish Coast Guard training center in Ismir. Senior-level officers from the Coast Guard and Turkish police have visited USCG HQ, 5th District, USCGA, and LANTAREA.

**9. Recent USN interaction.** Again, as a NATO partner, Turkey has had considerable interaction with the USN. In the year and a half before *Dallas's* visit, USS *Tortuga* and USS *Peterson* have both visited Samsun.

**10. Comments.** *Dallas's* visit to Samsun was a last-minute replacement after the visit to Ukraine was cancelled. Turkey was never listed in the development of *Dallas's* Mil-to-Mil schedule, most likely because of its already-developed navy and coast guard. What *Dallas* found was an extremely interested audience with a number of similarities to the USCG. During its visit to Samsun (and Istanbul), *Dallas* facilitated stronger coast guard-coast guard relations between these services.

## Bulgaria (10–13 July)

### 1. Interviews and discussions were held with:

- VADM Kontrov, Commander Bulgarian Naval Forces; CAPT (1st Rank) Manev, Commander Maritime Border Guard
- Mayor of Varna
- Mid and junior-grade Bulgarian Naval and Maritime Border Guard personnel including CDR Manushev, XO Varna Naval Base, LCDR Popov, Commander Bulgarian Naval Patrol Squadron; several Maritime Border Guard personnel including Commanders of patrol boat group and patrol boat COs and other officers; Naval Staff officers.
- U.S. Naval Attaché.

2. **Cutter as a more discreet form of presence.** Just as in Romania, the hypothesis that a cutter visit is a more discreet form of presence where high-profile visits are not yet appropriate was not tested here. Bulgaria's Navy is decidedly pro-Western and values USN ship visits as a sign of commitment. Interviews with U.S. Country Team personnel revealed no political or military sensitivities that might preclude a robust U.S. naval presence. (This was not true with air force and army interaction, where stronger anti-Western attitudes are still commonplace.)

3. **Dallas's Mil-to-Mil interaction.** Mil-to-Mil interaction began with official calls on VADM Kontrov (CNO-equivalent), CAPT Manev, the Commander of their maritime border guard, and the Mayor of Varna. This was followed by several days of *Dallas's* Mil-to-Mil discussion modules including Intro to the USCG, engineering, aviation, navigation as well as tours of Bulgarian vessels. Their navy and maritime border guard personnel were extremely interested in administrative questions of pay, leave, time under way as well as operational concerns and questions. *Dallas's* AVDET held extremely open and valuable discussions with Bulgarian pilots, both at their helo stations and on board *Dallas* (the Bulgarian Air Station CO and four pilots came aboard *Dallas* after their initial discussions at the air station). They are interested in developing hoisting techniques aboard their helos. The Aux-

iliary Engineering team conducted several discussions aboard the Bulgarian vessel *Dimitrov*.

PASSEX discussions occurred throughout the week, with the Bulgarians presenting an aggressive PASSEX schedule at the first meeting. They called for an embargo scenario where *Dallas* would interrogate and then board their vessel, demonstrating techniques and procedures. The PASSEX also included a rescue and assistance demonstration and a SAR demonstration that involved deploying a rescue swimmer from *Dallas's* helo.

*Dallas* personnel were taken on tours of the Varna naval base and taken on board naval vessels (a Koni class frigate and border guard patrol boats).

**4. Missions of their forces.** VADM Kontrov and mid-grade officers enthusiastically spoke about their coastal missions and responsibilities (in comparison to Romania). These include:

- Maritime Interdiction; there was an interest in supporting an embargo or other U.N.-sponsored maritime operation (although no further details were available)
- SAR and rescue and assistance of vessels
- Fisheries protection. (There were several Turkish fishing vessels held in the harbor at the time.)

**5. Audience.** *Dallas* interacted with both the Bulgarian navy and its maritime border forces throughout the visit. The border guard was involved in both the discussion modules as well as the PASSEX planning meetings and during the PASSEX. Official calls were paid to the Commander of Bulgaria's maritime border guard.

**6. Ongoing debates regarding the future of their maritime forces.** VADM Kontrov described a debate over the future division of responsibilities between the navy and a number of other maritime organizations, primarily the maritime border forces but also customs and State Inspection of Shipping. Many of these organizations face problems because they lack the funds and abilities (coastal surveillance sites and communications equipment) to respond to problems. They already rely on the navy for assistance. Kontrov implied that they need to consider either including these responsibilities under the Navy or

granting greater authority to these various organizations. He implied that the navy was the best solution. He emphasized that they are searching for the "right formula" in terms of their maritime responsibilities.

**7. Immediate consequences from Dallas's visit.** There was no discussion concerning specific requests for foreign students at USCG schools or senior-level officer visits. However, after Dallas's visit, the U.S. Ambassador to Bulgaria responded by message that the visit was a "resounding" success and that the Coast Guard has the potential to play an important role in his country strategy. He has directed his staff to pursue opportunities for follow-on contact with the USCG.

**8. Other related events ongoing.** Nothing else was ongoing at the time of Dallas's visit. Several USCG reps have visited Bulgaria to assess equipment needs for operations on the Danube and to assist in training and infrastructure development for these patrol boats (1993). Bulgarian border guard personnel have received a brief from 7th District representatives while visiting the U.S. Border Patrol Academy.

**9. Recent USN interaction.** Previous USN interaction with Bulgaria has included participation in BREEZE as well as annual flagship visits and regular PASSEXes. Generally, these focus on tactical maneuvering, communications drills, and ASW screening. BREEZE 95 included participation with USS *Hawes*, followed by a port visit to Varna in conjunction with Bulgaria's Navy Day events. USS *Kauffman* stopped in Varna in May 95, and the USS *Pensacola* in July 95 as part of the amphibious demonstration. Other recent ship visits have included USS *Radford*, *Portland*, *Deyo*, *Grapple*, *Austin*, *Doyle*, and *Platte*.

**10. Comments.** Bulgaria's navy is in a similar situation to Romania's. The navy is the dominant maritime service compared to other smaller organizations and it is being forced to deal with the development of its coastal responsibilities. The Bulgarians, however, were quicker to discuss these changing missions and admit the significance of the USCG as a model for balancing coastal and blue-water responsibilities. They have also requested information and interaction with the French Navy, which combines many of its coastal and blue-water missions into a single service.

## Tunisia (17–20 July)

1. Interviews and discussions were held with:

- CAPT de Vaisseau (CV) Tarik El Arbi, Commander La Pecherie Naval Base
- LT Guazdaoui, Commanding Officer of Didon; other Tunisian naval and specific SNSC mid- and junior-grade officers (mostly operational/patrol boat COs and XOs)
- U.S. Ambassador and Naval Attaché.

2. **Cutter as a more discreet form of presence.** Tunisia was the first country where the cutter's role as a discreet form of presence may pose a factor. Discussions with the U.S. Ambassador as well as the Naval Attaché indicated that, given Tunisia's role in the OAS and its relations with muslim nations, there might be scenarios where a high-profile USN presence might not be acceptable. They mentioned the situation during the Gulf War when the Tunisian population largely supported Hussein and a high-profile U.S. presence would not be acceptable. However, there is currently a high degree of interaction between Tunisia and the USN, so future scenarios are purely hypothetical.

3. **Dallas's Mil-to-Mil interaction.** According to the Naval Attaché, there was a decision to bring the cutter to Bizerte rather than Tunis because it is the operational and training center for Tunisia's navy. For this reason, *Dallas's* official calls were to local base officials rather than to Tunisia's CNO or Defense Minister.

Much like Turkey, Tunisia maintains a fairly well-developed coast guard. Tunisia's Service Nationale Surveillance Cotiere (SNSC) exists as part of its navy. Both regular navy and SNSC personnel were included in *Dallas's* discussions, and all officers seemed relatively well-informed as to the USCG and its roles and missions.

Approximately 20 Tunisian personnel (navy and SNSC) attended the Intro to the USCG, MIO, SAR, and damage control modules. Discussions were especially successful because of the Tunisians' knowledge of English compared to previous Mil-to-Mil visits. Again, questions

were generally specific in nature and covered MIO techniques as well as the USCG's relationship with local authorities and customs officials.

PASSEX meetings were included in the Mil-to-Mil schedule. There was specific interest in an interdiction scenario and a SAR demonstration. A damage control demonstration was also included. Instead of using COMSIXTHFLT's PASSEX guidance for Tunisia, *Dallas* developed its own scenarios, relying on the *International Code of Signals* publication for communications. COMSIXTHFLT's PASSEX guidance is focused entirely on Battle Group operations and communications and relies on EXTAC 768 (now EXTAC 1000). During the PASSEX, 12 Tunisian officers sailed aboard *Dallas* and six *Dallas* personnel aboard the *Didon*.

**4. Missions of their forces.** The SNSC focuses on the following missions:

- Pollution control to protect Tunisia's tourist industry
- Fisheries protection (mostly from Italian vessels)
- Safety and general inspections.

The SNSC is integrated into the navy and relies largely on smaller patrol boats for the above missions. At the same time both naval and SNSC units support each other in their more traditional naval missions of:

- Interdiction (smuggling)
- Anti-insurgency operations
- Coastal Surveillance and defense.

**5. Audience.** The audience was limited to Tunisian naval personnel (including specific SNSC personnel). A national guard does exist, which controls small patrol boats out to a 3-n.mi. limit, but none of these personnel were included in discussions.

**6. Ongoing debates regarding the future of their maritime forces.** Discussions with several mid-grade Tunisian officers (patrol boat COs)

revealed only a small debate over the level of autonomy of their SNSC relative to the navy. There was some opinion that the SNSC should become more autonomous. However, this was not a widely held opinion as far as the personnel involved with *Dallas's* visit. A number of Tunisian officers were keenly interested in the fact that the USCG maintains its own Officer Candidate Course and other training mechanisms separate from the USN.

**7. Immediate consequences from *Dallas's* visit.** There was considerable discussion about sending Tunisian students to the USCGA as well as other Coast Guard courses/schools. According to the Naval Attache, their CNO, Mohamed Cherif, remains interested in such an arrangement.

**8. Other related events ongoing.** There was a 1994 training team for fisheries protection in Tunisia. Their CNO has also made calls on the Commandant and visited the USCGA.

**9. Recent USN interaction.** Navy interaction occurs frequently between the USN and Tunisia—usually in Tunis. Again, La Pecherie/Bizerte was judged more appropriate because it is the operational and training center of the Navy.

**10. Comments.** Tunisia has a relatively well-developed organization for addressing its coastal missions. For that reason, the interaction between *Dallas* and Tunisian personnel was detailed (very similar to the level of detail with Turkish Coast Guard personnel). Most surprising to the U.S. Naval Attaché was the extent to which Tunisian naval personnel spoke English and had attended USN schools or spent time as shipriders deployed on USN vessels. In the past, the Tunisian Navy has maintained stronger ties elsewhere (to the French) and been slow to rely on U.S. equipment and training. The Naval Attaché believes this may represent a major shift in the outlook of the navy as a whole. Given the fact that there was so much interest in USCG schools (USCGA and USCG Officer Candidate School), the USCG may also play a role in creating closer ties with the Tunisian Navy.



## Slovenia (24–28 July)

1. Interviews and discussion were held with:

- Mayor of Koper
- BG Philipic, District Military Commander; CDR Gersak, Commander of Slovenian Naval Unit; Mirko Slukan, Commander Slovenian Police; Commander Slovenian Maritime Police
- Mid- to junior-grade personnel from several organizations including Zvezdan Bozic, Inspector for Special Tasks; MAJ Dobran Bozic, Slovenian Army liaison for Dallas visit and representative from Slovenian General Staff
- U.S. Country Team, including DCM, Mahlon Henderson, and MLT Leader and personnel.

2. **Cutter as a more discreet form of presence.** There was a sense here that large/high-profile visits might be inappropriate but not due to political or military reasons. Discussions with the DCM revealed that such visits might be unacceptable because of the relatively small size of the city of Koper and the inability of the local community to absorb large number of U.S. personnel. USS *Bradley* was the first USN ship to visit Koper and was well-accepted by the community. However, U.S. Country Team personnel have warned against larger visits (such as a proposed visit of an amphibious ship).

3. **Dallas's Mil-to-Mil interaction.** *Dallas's* interaction in Slovenia received considerable attention from the public, press, and military. The Slovenian military is essentially starting from scratch and is trying to build its forces rationally according to Slovenian threats and interests. There was considerable interest in the structure and organization of the USCG, how the Slovenians might organize their own SAR infrastructure, and in specific SAR and MIO techniques and procedures.

The Slovenian participants were also eager to share their own experiences and capabilities. They had considerable expertise in mountain SAR, counter-terrorism and anti-insurgency, and diving and underwater demolition. On the third day in port, the Slovenian police flew in one of their helos so the pilots could hold discussions with *Dallas's* AVDET.

Discussions included Intro to the USCG, SAR, MIO, damage control, aviation, medical, and navigation. The core group of participants included 10 maritime police, several naval officers, several customs officials, and other various personnel. Questions ranged from overall organization of the USCG and relations with other agencies (especially in relation to SAR) to detailed questions of boarding techniques and procedures.

There was considerable interest in the PASSEX on *Dallas's* final day in port, so much so that *Dallas's* helo was allowed to fly in Slovenian air space. The PASSEX included an interdiction scenario, a damage control/rescue and assistance scenario, and a rescue swimmer demonstration with the embarked HH-65A. It was conducted with *Dallas* anchored outside the harbor.

**4. Missions of their forces.** Missions of the Slovenian maritime forces include:

- Maritime interdiction; mostly of immigrants but also some smuggling
- Anti-insurgency operations (out of a fear of terrorism and involvement in a spreading Yugoslavian conflict); special insertions and underwater demolition and diving; (this focus calls for specialized interaction with the USN or SOCCOM.)
- Search and rescue
- Vessel safety and documentation inspection.

**5. Audience.** The audience *Dallas* reached in Slovenia was probably the broadest of all visits. Participants included:

- Navy
- Police and Maritime Police
- Harbor Master and Port Authority
- Army
- Air Force
- Customs.

There was, in fact, a debate between the navy (Ministry of Defense) and the maritime police over who "controlled" *Dallas's* visit. Slove-

nia's naval unit is especially small and includes 20-30 personnel and a few small RHIs. The maritime police are a larger organization and have recently bought several 20m patrol craft from Italy. Though both were included in all discussions, the maritime police took a larger role in developing the PASSEX and all in-port discussions.

It is interesting to note that the MLT reps who were interviewed believe that *Dallas's* visit did, in fact, help bring these two organizations together and establish better relations.

**6. Ongoing debates regarding the future of their maritime forces.** In many ways, Slovenia's debate regarding its maritime forces is the most interesting. The Slovenians are essentially starting from scratch and are trying to build a rationale maritime force dependent on their interests and threats. The Slovenians have hosted a French Corvette (as their first Western port visit after their independence), and they view the French Navy as an alternative model to the USCG—the French Navy includes its coastal and blue water responsibilities into a single force.

**7. Immediate consequences from *Dallas's* visit.** There was discussion of sending Slovenian students to the National SAR School.

**8. Other related events ongoing.** Slovenia participated in the recent G-CI sponsored program by bringing over senior-level officers to tour Coast Guard facilities in the states. Several of those officers actively participated in *Dallas's* activities and discussions during this visit.

**9. Recent USN interaction.** USS *Bradley* was the first USN ship to visit Slovenia. Its purpose was entirely official/ceremonial (being the first USN ship to visit), and there was little Mil-to-Mil engagement. There were ceremonies and official calls and tours of the ship to the public.

**10. Comments.** The success of *Dallas's* interaction in Slovenia was due mostly to the wide variety of organizations that the visit attracted—each had a particular area of interest which coincided with responsibilities of the USCG. Given Slovenia's recent development as a nation, these various organizations are struggling to balance these missions and interests in a logical manner. The USCG is one model they are considering for their maritime forces.

## Italy (31 July–4 Aug)

1. Interviews and discussions were held with:

- CAPT Peveri, Commanding Officer of Corvette Squadron (COMFLOT CORV-Augusta (SR)); CDR Malfatti, Director of SAR Assets/Rescue Coordination Center Rome; CDR Rossi, CO of CHIMARON

2. **Cutter as a more discreet form of presence.** As a NATO partner with a long-standing history of interaction with the USN, this visit did not effectively test this hypothesis.

3. **Dallas's Mil-to-Mil interaction.** *Dallas's* in-port discussions were limited during the Taranto port visit. ITN personnel received the overview of the USCG and aviation modules and *Dallas* personnel toured the ITN/ITCG training center MARICENTADD. It should be noted that *Dallas's* discussion modules were designed to be basic in nature and aimed at developing maritime forces. The ITN and ITCG are well-developed and less likely to benefit from classroom discussion of USCG missions and procedures.

*Dallas* and Italian aviators held detailed and valuable discussions. Italian aviators were particularly interested in the use of cold water immersion suits in the case of an emergency landing.

**SAREX.** The bilateral SAREX held a week after *Dallas* left Taranto (11 Aug) was far more valuable in terms of USCG-ITN/ITCG interaction. The exercise included *Dallas*, two ITN vessels (CHIMERA and SPICA), two ITCG vessels (CP 451 and CP 409), and their embarked helos prosecuting a SAR case under the direction of RCC Rome. COMLANTAREA provided a liaison officer to RCC Rome to assist with coordination and to demonstrate the USCG's Geographic Display Operations Computer (GDOC) program for SAR planning. At the same time, the Italians demonstrated their own software based largely on U.S. SAR techniques and procedures. The exercise realistically tested the response to and prosecution of a SAR case with numerous assets all assuming coordinated track line search patterns.

The exercise was shortened because of unforeseen circumstances and the target was not located. Still, discussions and communications were seen as valuable by the Italians. *Dallas* hosted approximately 15 Italian naval and Coast Guard personnel, and several *Dallas* personnel rode aboard all four Italian ships. The Italian personnel were most interested in *Dallas*'s communications suite and their computer and other support for SAR cases.

**4. Missions of their forces.** Most of the ITCG's missions fall under their Ministry of Transportation. These include SAR, safety inspections, fisheries protection, and pollution control and response. The ITCG is also concerned with the flow of refugees from Albania. They maintain two patrol boat groups in Albania—one in Durres and one in Vlore—to help address the problem. Like the USCG, the ITCG is an armed force that supports the navy (and Ministry of Defense) in times of war.

**5. Audience.** During the Taranto port visit and the bilateral SAREX, *Dallas* personnel met with ITN and ITCG personnel.

**6. Ongoing debates regarding the future of their maritime forces.** Based on our discussions with Italian naval and coast guard personnel, we discerned no visible debate between the ITN and ITCG regarding the break-down of their roles and responsibilities. Several ITCG personnel expressed dissatisfaction with the ITCG's relationship with other maritime organizations, including the Carabinieri (military police), the police, and customs. This dissatisfaction concerned the fact that these organizations handle responsibilities that should be left to the ITCG, such as vessel inspection and documentation checks. In general, this debate did not seem to be any more than normal bureaucratic in-fighting.

**7. Immediate consequences from *Dallas*'s visit.** Perhaps the most immediate consequence from *Dallas*'s visit was the interest expressed by several ITCG personnel in the USCG's GDOC SAR program after the SAREX. The program is much more sophisticated than current ITCG SAR programs. ITCG personnel also viewed the USCG liaison officer at their RCC during the exercise as extremely valuable and look forward to future arrangements.

8. **Other related events ongoing.** There were no related events ongoing with the USCG. It is interesting to note, however, the level of coordination between the Italians and the Albanians. Besides the stationing of Italian patrol boats in Durres and Vlore, the Italians are helping the Albanians develop a naval academy. Albanian students embark on the Italian naval academy training ship.

9. **Recent USN interaction.** Again, given the fact that Italy is a NATO partner, Italy has had considerable interaction with the USN.

10. **Comments.** Mil-to-Mil discussions were limited during this visit. Valuable interaction occurred during the SAREX. The Taranto port visit did allow *Dallas's* CO, operations officer, CNA rep, and others to travel to Gaeta, Italy, to USS *LaSalle* for a hot wash brief with COM-SIXTHFLT personnel.

SIXTHFLT personnel as well as ITCG personnel mentioned the recent sinking of a Greek merchant vessel in the Ionian. RCC Rome coordinated the efforts of numerous rescue vessels, finally directing U.S. C-130s to the area because of weather conditions. This incident prompted the Italians to approach COMNAVSOUTH to ensure accepted procedures for SAR coordination among NATO partners. Both USN and ITCG personnel felt that increased interaction with the USCG would prove useful in such a situation.

## Albania (5–9 Aug)

### 1. Interviews and discussions were held with:

- RADM Kucana (CNO equivalent); BG Vincani, Vice Chief of Staff, Albanian General Staff
- CAPT (1st rank) Robert Pero, Chief of Operations, Albanian Naval Staff; CAPT (1st rank) Osman Metalla, Chief Inspector of Durres Harbor; CAPT (2nd rank) Thomai, Chief of Electronic Engineering; Chief of Training (CAPT 3rd rank); CO of VJOSA (F322) and Albanian Ministry of Defense Liaison Officer; various junior officers from Ministry of Defense and Navy staff as well as operational billets
- LTC Steve Bucci (DATT); EUCOM MLT personnel including CDR John van Hise
- USCG participants in Maritime Law Enforcement Conference (CAPT David Kantor, Team Leader; CDR Nicholas Grasselli)

2. **Cutter as a more discreet form of presence.** A more discreet form of presence was not required in Albania, according to U.S. Country Team and MLT members. There have been recent visits including USS *Ponce* and USS *Sirocco*, and the Albanians are pursuing strong ties with the U.S. (to include more USN ship visits).

3. **Dallas's Mil-to-Mil interaction.** *Dallas's* in-port discussions were very successful in Albania and included a large number of participants. Discussion modules included MIO, SAR, DC, auxiliary engineering, and aviation. Albanian officers were interested both in the broad missions of the USCG as well as the discussion of detailed procedures and techniques.

*Dallas's* PASSEX with the Albanian Navy included an interdiction scenario and a damage control scenario while moored in the harbor (using *Dallas's* small boats). *Dallas's* MIO and DC boarding teams went aboard an Albanian mine sweeper to demonstrate their techniques and hold general question and discussion sessions. Language difficulties limited the discussions (as they did with the Black Sea nations).

4. **Missions of their forces.** The Albanian Navy is struggling to handle its growing coastal responsibilities. These include the interdiction of refugees from Albania to Italy (for which the Italians are offering considerable assistance), fisheries protection, smuggling by fast boat along Albania's coasts, pollution control and response, and SAR.

5. **Audience.** *Dallas* personnel met primarily with Albanian naval personnel. They also interacted with air force aviators and Ministry of Defense personnel.

6. **Ongoing debates regarding the future of their maritime forces.** RADM Kucana (CNO) recognized Albania's coastal responsibilities, but argued that Albania lacks the money to establish a separate coast guard. Instead, Albania requires naval patrol boats and helos that can deal with the fast boats smuggling goods along its coasts and across the Adriatic. RADM Kucana plans on integrating these new coastal assets into each naval district as they become available.

7. **Immediate consequences from *Dallas's* visit.** There were several informal requests by RADM Kucana and others to investigate sending Albanian students to USCG schools and courses (specifically MLE School in Yorktown). There was also discussion regarding the transfer of USN patrol boats or USCG cutters to the Albanians (which is expected in the coming year). The U.S. Defense Attaché responded after *Dallas's* visit that the discussions and PASSEX as well as the Maritime Law Enforcement Conference sponsored by the USCG show the vital role of the USCG in the Country Team's (and MLT personnel) objectives.

8. **Other related events ongoing.** During *Dallas's* visit, there were several important and related events ongoing that involved the Albanians and the USCG. These include:

- The Maritime Legal Conference in Tirana at the time of *Dallas* visit which included Albanian, Ukrainian, Romanian, and Bulgarian personnel. The Conference was hosted jointly by the Albanian Ministry of Defense and the USCG. Conference participants came aboard *Dallas* to observe the MIO discussion module.



- The current debate within the Albanian government regarding its maritime code. This code gives the Albanian Navy more responsibilities and rights to interdict and board suspect vessels. The USCG has provided some support in developing the code, which is now being considered by the Albanian parliament.
- The possible transfer of patrol craft (possibly USCG 82-foot cutters). Albanian personnel were intensely interested in such a transfer and spoke as if the U.S. had already promised that it would happen. U.S. Country Team and MLT personnel feel strongly that such a transfer occur given the perception that the U.S. has promised support in the past but never followed through.
- The recent visit by Albanian senior officers to USCG facilities (including Head Quarters, Reserve Training Center Yorktown, 5th District Ops Center, Group Hampton Roads, etc.) sponsored by G-CI.
- The upcoming visit of the Albanian President and Defense Minister to the United States this Fall.

9. **Recent USN interaction.** Previous interaction with USN has included ship visits by USS *Ponce*, *Edenton*, and *Sirocco*. The *Ponce* conducted two SAREXes (SAREX I and II), which focused mostly on combat and overland SAR. U.S. Navy, Army, and Marine Corps personnel have also assisted in the Crystal Waters Task Force, which is building a military hospital as well assisting in strengthening the Albanian civilian (and military) infrastructure. The visit of USS *Sirocco* months before *Dallas*'s visit was viewed as very successful by Albanian and U.S. Country Team personnel. This visit touched on several of the same areas, including interdiction of smuggling and refugees.

10. **Comments.** Albania was one of the more successful of *Dallas*'s visits (along with Slovenia), due in part to the willingness of its Navy to discuss Albania's coastal missions and to recognize the budget constraints that will affect its force structure choices. Most interesting was the number of ongoing events between Albania and the USCG. There is a strong push by the Albanians to obtain USN patrol craft (possibly even USCG cutters) to pursue coast guard functions. Albanian military leadership has also made a strong push to continue interaction with the U.S. and USCG.

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